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INTRODUCTION
For more than a quarter-century, immigration law’s interior enforcement agenda
has fixated on the workplace and the criminal justice system. Every hiring decision
and every traffic stop transpires in the shadow of the immigration code. Within this
far-reaching universe, employers and the police have reigned supreme. Each stands
as a gatekeeper for their respective institutions—a recruitment pitch often opens one
gate, a street encounter the other—and while much has been written about these agents
of immigration law, they are typically treated as separate subjects of academic inquiry.
This essay shows how these front-line immigration decisionmakers are coming to-
gether. Specifically, I argue that the Executive’s workplace enforcement policy is being
undermined by its growing use of criminal law actors for immigration purposes.
To start with, the Obama Administration has deprioritized the removal of im-
migrant workers. It has chosen instead to focus on the employers themselves,1 with a
particular focus on “exploitative employers”—those who knowingly hire and exploit
* Assistant Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine School of Law. For comments and conversa-
tions about this essay, I am grateful to Sameer Ashar, Jennifer Chacón, Jon Michaels, Hiroshi
Motomura, Shirin Sinnar, and Juliet Stumpf. Special thanks go to Angela Banks for her intel-
lectual leadership in organizing the symposium, “Noncitizen Participation in the American
Polity,” and to the William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal for sponsoring the event. I very
much appreciate the fine editorial assistance provided by Brian Rothenberg and the other editors
of the journal. Please direct comments and questions to slee@law.uci.edu.
1 See, e.g., Adriana Gardella, As Immigration Audits Increase, Some Employers Pay a
High Price, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2011, at B10.
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immigrant labor. A key part of this strategy has been constraining the ability of
employers to report unauthorized workers to immigration officials as a way of
avoiding liability for workplace violations.2 One of the ways President Obama has
distinguished himself from past administrations has been by targeting bad actor
employers through the creative use of the administrative state. Some of the regu-
latory innovations force immigration enforcement-related investigations to yield to
labor enforcement-related investigations; others enable unauthorized workers to pur-
sue workplace claims before being removed; still others allow unauthorized workers
with such claims to avoid removal altogether.3 Moreover, agencies with a workplace-
oriented mandate—like the Department of Labor (DOL)—have come to play a more
prominent role in the enforcement of immigration laws. All of these workplace en-
forcement fixes rest on the same rationale: discouraging employers from engaging
in the strategic reporting of immigration-related information will advance the goal
of deterring employers from hiring and exploiting immigrant workers.
Meanwhile, the Executive has sent a different type of message to sheriffs and
police officers, who have emerged as key figures in another major interior enforce-
ment program: the pursuit of noncitizen criminals for removal.4 Having announced
that the removal of “criminal aliens” is the Administration’s top immigration en-
forcement priority,5 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has undertaken
an unprecedented effort to encourage and, in many cases, compel local police to share
immigration-related information with federal immigration officials. Although there
might be some instances where the Executive discourages such contact from local
police,6 interior enforcement as a whole is evolving in a direction that relies heavily
on the engagement of local police. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, local law en-
forcement officers are effectively required to share immigration-related information
2 I have written about this practice in previous work. See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration
Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (2009). The immigration code requires
all employers to verify the immigration status of their workers, which means they extract sen-
sitive information about their workers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (2006).
3 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel on Prose-
cutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter
Morton Memorandum], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion
/certain-victims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf (instructing immigration officials to pay particular
attention to individuals “who may be in a non-frivolous dispute with an employer” as poten-
tial candidates for favorable exercises of prosecutorial discretion).
4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006) (requiring federal officials to work with local officials in
identifying aliens incarcerated through local government, and to designate and train liaisons
to carry out such purpose).
5 See Charlie Savage, 2,901 Arrested in Crackdown on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at A14.
6 See infra Part III.
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with ICE on every person they arrest.7 This is a recent development,8 and one that
has come to define the Obama Administration’s approach to immigration enforce-
ment. Rather than utilizing the 287(g) program9—an “opt-in” model of local en-
forcement where each jurisdiction decides whether to assist the federal government
in identifying potentially removable immigrants—the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has openly embraced the Secure Communities Program (S-Comm),10
which compels every jurisdiction to assist in this endeavor. Under S-Comm, every
set of fingerprints submitted to a national criminal information database is automati-
cally re-routed to a DHS database for immigration screening purposes. S-Comm
requires no opt in, and indeed, its design is indifferent to the immigration enforcement
preferences of the local officers submitting the fingerprints.
By themselves, these structural distinctions are unremarkable. Different regula-
tory challenges often invite different information-sharing policies, and the compara-
tive case of workplace enforcement and “crimmigration”11 policies would seem no
different. On the surface, deterring workplace exploitation and identifying noncit-
izen criminals for removal appear to have little to do with one another. But however
distinct these strategies may appear, the growing anecdotal evidence suggests that
these strategies are getting tangled up as a matter of practice. Consider this example:
Michael Tebb hired Jose Ucelo-Gonzalez to assist him with a parking lot project in
Garden Grove, California.12 At the end of the day, Tebb allegedly refused to pay Ucelo-
Gonzalez, and as their exchange escalated, Tebb contacted the Garden Grove police.13
The local prosecutor quickly dropped the charges, but no matter: Ucelo-Gonzalez’s
brief tenure in jail was apparently long enough for ICE to verify his unauthorized
7 See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 182 (2005).
8 See Fact Sheet: Transforming the Immigration Enforcement System, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/fact-sheet-transforming
-immigration-enforcement-system.
9 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g) (2006).
10 Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov
/secure_communities/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
11 The immigration law and criminal law systems have become so intertwined, scholars
have come to refer to it as a single “crimmigration” system. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón,
Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009); Teresa A.
Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September
11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad
Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
12 See Complaint para. 13, Ucelo-Gonzalez v. Tebb (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 30-2012-
00588416-CU-ML-CJC).
13 See id. at para. 17.
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immigration status and issue a detainer thus triggering the removal process.14 The
wage theft Tebb allegedly committed (and the manner in which he committed it)
makes him precisely the kind of “exploitative employer” the Obama Administration
has set out to punish. But because the vast majority of arrests result in automatic
immigration screening, employers have the ability to recast their workers—the
victims of wage theft and other workplace violations—as “criminal aliens,” thus
evading detection. This troubling case illustrates how the Executive’s far-reaching
insinuations into the criminal justice system are poised to undermine workplace
protections, which have long been understood to shield unauthorized workers
against exploitation.
In this essay, I argue that the Executive’s increased reliance on local law en-
forcement to identify “criminal aliens” undermines competing commitments in the
realm of workplace enforcement, which sets out to identify and punish “exploita-
tive employers.” In developing this point, I rely on insights generated by public law
scholars in a conversation over what they call “workarounds.” Within the work-
arounds framework, legal actors achieve some outcome or goal, which is formally
prohibited by one set of rules but achievable by a separate, often unrelated set of
rules.15 Here, while workplace enforcement rules formally prohibit (or at least sig-
nificantly raise the costs of) reporting workers to evade liability for workplace vio-
lations, S-Comm’s immigration screening requirement undermines these rules by
creating an alternate route for reporting workers.
Examining programs like S-Comm through a workarounds lens generates two
primary insights. First, as the Ucelo-Gonzalez example demonstrates, transferring
immigration authority to local law enforcement officers creates opportunities for
employers to circumvent the very information-sharing restrictions that have come
to define workplace enforcement policy. Such workarounds can be particularly deft
under S-Comm where all that is required to trigger scrutiny by federal immigration
officials is an arrest.16 As the Ucelo-Gonzalez example illustrates, it does not matter
that a prosecutor drops the charges. An arrest is enough to transform a noncitizen
into a “criminal alien.” A second insight concerns allocations of power within the
Executive. Although the devolution of immigration enforcement authority to local
police often invites worries about the federal government ceding power to sub-
federal entities,17 in another respect, programs like S-Comm have an aggrandizing
effect: enlisting the help of local police allows ICE to expand its enforcement power
at the DOL’s expense.
14 For more details, see infra Part II.B.
15 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1503–
04 (2009).
16 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 (2011).
17 See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).
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Part I provides an overview of the immigration law’s interior enforcement strat-
egy. In this Part, I summarize recent changes in workplace enforcement policy and
in those programs geared towards identifying “criminal aliens.” I explain how these
enforcement schemes rest on different informational rules: while employers are dis-
couraged from reporting the presence of potentially removable immigrants, local
law enforcement officers are often welcomed and increasingly required to do so.
Part II shows how the Obama Administration’s pursuit of “criminal aliens” has
the strong potential for frustrating its competing goal of punishing “exploitative
employers.” In other words, I show how one interior enforcement arm is working
at cross-purposes with the other. After developing a working definition of work-
arounds, I provide examples of local police being drawn into workplace disputes.
Importantly, as these examples demonstrate, workarounds do not require employers
to know that contacting police will lead to the issuance of an immigration detainer,
nor do they require police to realize that arresting “troublemaker” migrants facili-
tates the suppression of labor and employment rights. Nevertheless, “criminal alien”
enforcement programs have the effect of destabilizing the enforcement of workplace
rights by unauthorized migrants. Moreover, although programs like S-Comm are de-
signed to give away power to local entities, such programs allow ICE to amass power
in another, less noticeable respect. By creating more entry points into the removal
pipeline, ICE hampers (and thus expands its power at the expense of) the DOL, whose
privacy challenge in workplace enforcement is credibly conveying to workers that
no immigration consequences will follow from their decision to pursue workplace
claims. By way of conclusion, Part II teases out the regressive elements of S-Comm:
localities are now positioned to either facilitate or prevent the suppression of labor
rights, a position local police have not confronted since the pre–World War II era.
Part III addresses whether and to what extent these workarounds are correctable.
Although there are a number of reasons to criticize that the Executive is pursuing
“criminal aliens,” my primary focus here is on the limitations tied up in how it is
choosing to do so. Thus, my primary focus here is whether the President and high-
level policymakers have a meaningful opportunity to oversee the process by which
immigrants like Ucelo-Gonzalez are swept into the removal pipeline. As I explain,
the policy choice to pursue criminal aliens through S-Comm, which casts a wide and
indiscriminate screening net, will hamper the Executive’s ability to coordinate its
interior enforcement agenda. I then conclude.
I. INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT TARGETS
For many years, immigration scholarship focused on screening challenges at
the border,18 but in recent years, immigration scholars have extended the screening
18 See, e.g., Janet A. Gilboy, Deciding Who Gets In: Decisionmaking by Immigration
Inspectors, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 571 (1991).
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framework into the interior.19 While there are many social institutions through which
migrants move, two have emerged as central to immigration law’s interior enforce-
ment agenda: the workplace and the criminal justice system.20 Because much has
already been written about immigration law’s intersections with both labor and em-
ployment law21 on the one hand, and criminal law on the other,22 I will provide only
a cursory overview of the relevant immigration enforcement programs governing
each institution. But these summaries perform important prefatory work in setting
up the dynamic with which I am primarily concerned in Part II, namely that strate-
gies designed to target “criminal aliens” can frustrate strategies for deterring the ex-
ploitation of immigrant workers. The salient point here is that both employers and
local law enforcement entities are charged with the responsibility of gathering
immigration-related information but are subject to different constraints as to what
they can do with this information once they obtain it. Whereas modern workplace
enforcement rules discourage employers from sharing immigration-related infor-
mation, the police are largely encouraged to share such information regarding their
investigatory targets.
A. “Exploitative Employers”
As is well known by now, 1986 was a major turning point in the enforcement
of immigration laws in the workplace. That year, Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which imposed screening duties and the threat of
sanctions on our nation’s employers.23 The authorized migration system reflects the
notion that employers possess greater expertise and face stronger incentives to iden-
tify and screen potential migrant workers than do immigration officials. But em-
ployers can hire migrants only to the extent that doing so does not displace U.S. and
other authorized workers, and as a result, IRCA operates as a check on the labor
19 See generally Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immi-
gration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007); Lee, supra note 2; Huyen Pham, The Private
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008).
20 See infra Parts I.A–B.
21 See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model
of White-Collar Crime, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1041 (1990); Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of
Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409 (2011); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Em-
ployment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 201.
22 See supra note 11.
23 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
IRCA unfurled a three-part plan for reforming the immigration system of which employer
sanctions was just one part. It also created a legalization program for unauthorized migrants
and committed resources to fortifying the border. This was the last time the country reformed
the immigration code. IRCA’s workplace enforcement piece has been lambasted by scholars
as ineffective, a prime example of symbolic legislation, and for exacerbating an employer’s
ability to exploit unauthorized labor. See Calavita, supra note 21; Wishnie, supra note 21,
at 194–95, 201.
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migration flow. To prevent employers from hiring noncitizen workers outside of the
strictly regulated labor pool of authorized foreign workers, IRCA prohibits em-
ployers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and requires that they “verify”
all of their workers to implement this directive.24 IRCA’s verification requirements
are broadly conceived and apply to all 7.6 million employers in the United States.25
But because proving knowledge can be difficult, the reality has been that employers
enjoy a great deal of flexibility in selectively deploying verification duties to serve
their own purposes, which often includes the suppression of labor dissent.26
Historically, immigration officials have under-enforced immigration laws against
employers.27 Thus, an employer could usually hire and exploit unauthorized migrants
with little fear of reprisal from either the workers themselves or federal officials.28
By contrast, President Obama has prioritized bad actor or “exploitative” employers,
especially those engaging in the systematic and intentional exploitation of unautho-
rized labor.29 Moreover, the President has tried to neutralize the bargaining advantage
24 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (a)–(b) (2006).
25 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl. 759
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0759.pdf.
26 I have written about this elsewhere. See Lee, supra note 2, at 1107.
27 Id. at 1126.
28 This dynamic spurred Congress to revisit the screening process in 1996, when it es-
tablished numerous database refinements, most notably the “E-Verify” system. See Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 658, 661–62 (1996) (relevant provisions codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
(2006)). E-Verify did not change the verification requirements, only how they were carried
out. Instead of examining paperwork, E-Verify requires employers to cross-check a potential
employee’s identification information with a centralized database developed with informa-
tion compiled by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Several scholars have pointed
out that E-Verify actually harms citizens. Despite the greater oversight that E-Verify enables
immigration officials to exercise, critics point out that the SSA-based information provides
only spotty reliability. See, e.g., Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The
Constitutionality of Subfederal Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 390, 424–26
(2011) (explaining how E-Verify adversely affects workers with “uncommon spellings or
sequencing of last names” and noncitizen work-authorized workers more generally). They
also point out that E-Verify still provides employers plenty of leeway to deploy their verifi-
cation duties selectively. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About
E-Verify (and Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 401–04 (2012) (describing the
ways in which E-Verify exacerbates the affirmative misuse of verification duties).
29 ICE prioritizes targeting those employers who: “Utilize unauthorized workers as a busi-
ness model; Mistreat their workers; Engage in human smuggling or trafficking; Engage in
identity and benefit fraud; Launder money; [and] Participate in other criminal conduct.” See
Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (May 23, 2012),
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm. To be clear, enforcing immigration
laws in the workplace made for splashy news during the Bush Administration as well, but the
difference has been that unauthorized workers appearing as witnesses rather than as defen-
dants have become more commonplace under this Administration. See also Julia Preston, A
Crackdown on Employing Illegal Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A1 (“Obama ad-
ministration officials are sharpening their crackdown on the hiring of illegal immigrants by
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that employers have enjoyed over workers rendered vulnerable by their unauthorized
status.30 In particular, his Administration has developed policy designed to deter em-
ployers from using immigration law to escape liability for violations of labor and
employment law. Perhaps the most notable example is a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) prohibiting ICE officials from conducting enforcement actions in
workplaces where active DOL investigations are already underway.31 Although ICE
assumes primary enforcement authority over immigration enforcement matters in
the interior, other agencies, like the DOL, enjoy overlapping authority in the work-
place. And, as I’ve explained elsewhere, one goal of such interagency agreements
is to force ICE to take more seriously the need to protect immigrant workers against
exploitation, a goal that DOL is often more suited to handle than ICE.32 For similar
reasons, those who have been victims of workplace crimes may initiate the U visa
certification process by contacting the DOL instead of another agency with a more
traditional immigration enforcement mission.33 Both of these measures increase the
DOL’s ability to credibly signal to unauthorized workers that cooperating with labor
officials will not lead to immigration consequences like removal.
Other regulatory innovations encourage unauthorized workers to hold bad actor
employers accountable through the enforcement of private labor and employment
rights. The clearest example is a recent prosecutorial discretion memo released by
DHS.34 In evaluating the equitable consequences of removal, this memo instructs
immigration officials to consider the presence of a labor or civil rights claim as a
factor cutting in favor of declination.35 ICE officials are also instructed not to re-
spond to tips if doing so facilitates retaliation.36 This too is intended to guard the
workplace against immigration inspection while disputes are ongoing. Using this
regulatory toolkit—which contains a variety of tools ranging from interagency agree-
ments, U visa certification protocols, guidance documents, and a fairly consistent
focusing increasingly tough criminal charges on employers while moving away from crim-
inal arrests of the workers themselves.”).
30 See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Fresh Raids Target Illegal Hiring, WALL ST. J., May 2,
2012, at A2 (explaining that the DHS has cracked down on employers under President
Obama’s direction).
31 See Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
and U.S. Dep’t of Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites (Dec. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/dhs-dol-mou.pdf [hereinafter Revised
Memorandum of Understanding].
32 See Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089 (2011).
33 News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Announces Protocols for
Certifying U Visa Applications (Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media
/press/whd/WHD20110619.htm.
34 See Morton Memorandum, supra note 3.
35 See id.
36 See Memorandum from Office of Field Operations & Office of Programs, Revised
Operations Instruction 287.3a (Dec. 20, 1996), reprinted in 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 188
(1997). This was established as policy during the Clinton Administration, but has been imple-
mented with varying degrees of success across administrations.
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stream of public statements—the President has allocated resources for the purposes
of targeting the employers who hire unauthorized workers rather than plucking the
“low-hanging fruit” represented by the workers themselves. The collective effect is
not only to raise public enforcement of workplace laws as a viable threat, but to em-
bolden workers to enforce these laws through private means.37
To be clear, the willingness of the Obama Administration to provide greater oppor-
tunities for relief to immigrant workers should not be mistaken with the unwillingness
to remove immigrant workers. U visas, for example, are subject to statutory caps im-
posed by Congress. And establishing factors cutting in favor of prosecutorial discre-
tion certainly provides no guarantees of the actual deferral of removal. Once workers
get swept into the removal pipeline, the odds suggest that they will be removed,38 a
reality that even the President seems to acknowledge.39 Still, the shifts in workplace
enforcement policy, while relatively modest, are unmistakable. These shifts priori-
tize the punishment of exploitative employers; they enable labor enforcement agencies
like the DOL to more effectively intervene on behalf of immigrant workers; and they
create regulatory space for immigrant workers to pursue valid claims through private
enforcement channels.
B. “Criminal Aliens”
For social justice advocates, 1996 stands as a year of infamy. That year, Congress
passed a series of laws that nudged prisoners,40 the poor,41 and immigrants42 closer
37 See Steven Greenhouse & Steven Yaccino, Fight Over Immigrant Firings, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2012, at B1.
38 See Motomura, supra note 16.
39 In remarks he made last year about comprehensive reform, he explained: “[W]e’re
going after employers who knowingly exploit people and break the law. . . . And we are de-
porting those who are here illegally. And that’s a tough issue. It’s a source of controversy.”
See Press Release, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration in El Paso, Texas
(May 10, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/10/remarks-president
-comprehensive-immigration-reform-el-paso-texas [hereinafter President on Comprehensive
Immigration]. And of course, the shift in workplace enforcement policy may very well represent
a response to the shifting preferences of the public. See Julia Preston, Republicans Reconsider
Positions on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A12. He went on to remark: “That’s
not to ignore the real human toll of a broken immigration system. Even as we recognize that
enforcing the law is necessary, we don’t relish the pain that it causes in the lives of people
who are just trying to get by and get caught up in the system.” President on Comprehensive
Immigration, supra.
40 See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-34, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
41 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
42 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
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to the margins of society. It was also the year that Congress first hatched the scheme
that has become fairly commonplace today: the participation of local police in the
enforcement of immigration laws. It is in this respect that the Obama Administra-
tion has made its most significant changes in immigration enforcement. The Admin-
istration has fully embraced local law enforcement schemes as tools for identifying
“criminal aliens.”43
Congress and the Executive have erected a variety of enforcement schemes.44
For example, under the 287(g) program, Congress authorized the Executive to enter
into enforcement partnerships with state and local authorities.45 This deputization
program authorizes state and local enforcement officers to carry out immigration
functions.46 Some of these agreements operate within state jails; others operate in the
field; and still others operate in both.47 These agreements are not compulsory. Local
jurisdictions must opt into the program by signing a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), which memorializes the content and the limits of the delegated authority.48
Currently, sixty-eight law enforcement entities in twenty-four states have opted into
this program.49
The MOA is the key oversight instrument by which ICE ensures that local police
remain within the bounds of the delegation.50 MOAs are renewable, and ICE has
used this renewal power to ensure that participating jurisdictions remain faithful to
federal priorities.51 For example, in Arizona v. United States,52 the Court struck
down most of Arizona’s controversial immigration enforcement statute.53 The lone
provision to survive preemption allowed police officers to determine the immigra-
tion status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest, provided they have “reasonable
43 See Secure Communities, supra note 10.
44 For a useful overview of the various enforcement programs utilizing local law enforce-
ment entities, see Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1565–66 (2010).
45 The program is named after the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act in which
it is lodged. See the Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163,
amended by Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006)).
46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006).
47 For a good overview of the 287(g) program, see RANDY CAPPS ET AL., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2011),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf.
48 Participating officers must undergo a mandatory four-week training program. See Fact
Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g
.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
49 Id.
50 See Chacón, supra note 44, at 1583–86.
51 See id. at 1586 (“[T]he government can decline to enter into an [MOA] with that agency,
or can even cancel an existing one.”).
52 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
53 See id. at 2510 (striking down §§ 3, 5(c), and 6 of the Arizona statute).
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suspicion . . . that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United
States.”54 While the Executive failed to persuade the Court that its authority over
immigration enforcement displaced Arizona’s police force as a constitutional matter,
it partially achieved its goal of displacement through its indisputable control over the
287(g) program.55 The same day the Court issued its decision, the DHS cancelled all
of its 287(g) task force agreements with participating jurisdictions within the state of
Arizona,56 curtailing the ability of Arizona police officers to screen investigative tar-
gets for noncitizens, and disciplining the wayward activities of state officials whose
enforcement priorities had begun deviating from those of the federal government.
Although the withdrawal of Section 287(g) authority from Arizona provides an
interesting postscript to S.B. 1070, it is emblematic of a larger enforcement trend.
Generally speaking, DHS appears to be redirecting its resources away from 287(g)
agreements and towards S-Comm, an enforcement program which was unfurled near
the end of the Bush Administration but ramped up during the Obama Administration.
S-Comm is an information-sharing system.57 When street-level police arrest individ-
uals, they routinely check that individual’s fingerprints against the FBI criminal data-
base to ascertain whether the arrestee has a criminal record.58 S-Comm automatically
re-routes and cross-checks those fingerprints against DHS’s database, which houses
immigration-related information.59 Thus, by linking these two databases, ICE retains
the ability to carry out its enforcement goal of identifying and removing noncitizen
54 See id. at 2507 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012)).
55 See id. at 2506, 2508, 2510 (explaining that “the State may not pursue policies that
undermine federal law”).
56 See Morgan Little, Brewer Accuses Obama Administration of Telling Arizona to ‘Drop
Dead,’ L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-brewer
-accuses-obama-administration-of-telling-arizona-to-drop-dead-20120626,0,6802412.story.
Two additional points are worth mentioning. First, in December 2011, a Justice Department
investigation revealed widespread civil rights abuses in Arizona’s Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Office, which is headed by Joe Arpaio. See Richard A. Serrano & Ashley Powers, U.S. Finds
Bias by Arizona Sheriff, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A1. Shortly after the Justice Department’s
report was released, the DHS revoked Maricopa County’s authority to carry out Section 287(g)
duties within its jails. See Press Release, Statement by Sec’y Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings
of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.dhs
.gov/news/2011/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa
-county. As the Arpaio example suggests, the Executive can bring to bear a variety of over-
sight tools to discipline rogue local law enforcement partners engaging in wayward behavior,
though some forms of oversight (like a Justice Department investigation) can be costlier than
others. A second point is that the DHS’s en masse withdrawal of Section 287(g) power from
Arizona apparently left intact those 287(g) agreements operating within its jails. Jeremy
Duda, Homeland Security Revokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES
(June 25, 2012), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/25/homeland-security-revokes-287g
-immigration-check-agreements-in-arizona/.
57 See Secure Communities, supra note 10.
58 Id.
59 See id.
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criminals without having to worry about whether police are acting within the scope
of their formally delegated authority.
The pace at which the Obama Administration has implemented S-Comm has
been breathtaking. As others have pointed out, never in our nation’s history has a
program involving local enforcement of immigration laws reached so far, so fast.60
In November 2009, only 95 out of 3,181 local jurisdictions had been S-Comm
activated.61 By June 2012, that number jumped to 3,074, covering 97% of our na-
tion’s local jurisdictions.62 At this rate, ICE will likely achieve nationwide coverage
before its targeted deadline of 2013.63 All of this has led to an immense number of
deportations under the Obama Administration.64 In 2010, DHS deported more im-
migrants in a single year than any previous administration.65 It broke that record in
2011,66 and the DHS is always quick to point out that most of these deportations
involved people carrying convictions on their record.67 Moreover, the Executive has
shown little interest in accounting for local preferences in ramping up the program.68
Although a number of cities and states have publicly registered their objections
to S-Comm—including former advisors to the President69—the Executive has
60 See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Integrating Immigration and Criminal
Enforcement, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (explaining that “[S-Comm] is the
largest expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement in the nation’s history”).
61 See Editorial, Immigrants, Criminalized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, at A38.
62 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS (2012),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated1.pdf.
63 See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://
www.ice.gov/secure_communities/faq.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
64 See Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A18 (reporting nearly 800,000 deportations).
65 See Brian Bennett, Obama Administration Reports Record Number of Deportations,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/news/la-pn-deportation
-ice-20111018.
66 In 2011, the DHS removed 396,906 immigrants. See id. (noting that “[t]he annual total
was about 4,000 more deportations than the record set in the previous year”).
67 See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, FY 2011: ICE Announces Year-End Removal
Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities Including Threats to Public Safety and National
Security (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washington
dc.htm. A recent study suggests that S-Comm sweeps much more broadly than those with crim-
inal histories. See AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. L. & SOC. POL’Y,
BERKELEY L. SCH., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS
AND DUE PROCESS, at Figure 5 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure
_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf (suggesting that up to 37% of those swept into removal
proceedings through S-Comm are noncriminals).
68 See Preston, supra note 64 (reporting that the Executive continued to make the pro-
gram mandatory despite opposition).
69 The governors of a number of states, including Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York
have publicly registered their objections to the S-Comm program. See Julia Preston, Resistance
Widens to Obama Initiative on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.13, 2011, at A11.
Chicago’s mayor, Rahm Emanuel, who once served as President Obama’s chief of staff, has
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charged ahead insisting that its authority to implement the program does not require
local permission.70
II. WORKING AROUND WORKPLACE ENFORCEMENT
Employers and the police rarely move through the pages of the same piece of
immigration scholarship. At best, each plays a supporting role in the other’s story.71
But as I explain in this Part, growing anecdotal evidence suggests that the separate
spheres of the workplace and the criminal justice system are beginning to collide.
Although the ability of employers to report the presence of unauthorized workers
to ICE has become constrained,72 the police and other local law enforcement entities
face no such constraints. Therefore, reporting (or threatening to report) workers to
police effectively allows employers to circumvent modern workplace enforcement
policy. The police enable employers to achieve the prohibited outcome (suppressing
labor dissent) by acting as a workaround—an alternative path by which employers
can achieve the otherwise prohibited outcome. This dynamic reveals an interior en-
forcement policy at war with itself. In this part, I explain what workarounds are, pro-
vide some examples of how the Executive’s pursuit of “criminal aliens” is frustrating
its goal of punishing “exploitative employers,” and relate this shift to an earlier pe-
riod of history where police played an active role in responding to confrontations
between management and labor.
A. What Are Workarounds?
Legal scholars have long engaged in a conversation about how regulatory design
can affect outcomes.73 Workarounds represent one strand of this conversation. Within
the workarounds framework: (1) some legal rule or structure presents an obstacle to
the accomplishment of a certain goal; (2) another legal rule presents an alternative,
perhaps unusual means for accomplishing that goal; and (3) it is not entirely clear
joined the chorus of S-Comm critics. He announced plans to release a proposed ordinance
that would prevent police officers from turning over unauthorized migrants without serious
criminal records to immigration officials. See Julia Preston & Steven Yaccino, Obama Policy
on Immigrants Is Challenged by Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A14.
70 See Preston, supra note 64 (noting that the “Department of Homeland Security . . . has
said that Secure Communities is mandatory”).
71 But cf. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012).
72 See supra Part I.A.
73 See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post–9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Jacob E.
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT.
REV. 201.
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which rule should be given priority.74 Workarounds have been employed across a
variety of contexts, ranging from closely scrutinized national events like the passage
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (in which President Clinton submitted
the agreement as a statute rather than a treaty to exploit the less burdensome passage
requirements)75 to the more furtive intelligence-gathering endeavors of the Executive
in the war on terror (in which the President outsources data-gathering responsibilities
to circumvent restrictions imposed by privacy laws).76 In all of these instances, the
legal actor (be it Congress, the White House, or low-level agency officials) achieves
a policy result using means that are neither clearly encompassed nor formally pro-
hibited by existing law.77
Jon Michaels explains that the Executive regularly outsources services to private
entities “that provide the outsourcing agency with the means of achieving distinct
public policy goals more readily than would be possible in the ordinary course of
nonprivatized public administration.”78 For example. Congress has passed privacy
laws designed to constrain the ability of the Executive to collect personal data. But
these laws do not cover private entities. Thus, contracting out data-gathering services
to these entities allows the Executive to obtain information otherwise beyond its
reach79—that is, it enables the Executive to work around the privacy rules written
by Congress. Workarounds therefore provide the Executive with the means “to gain
greater control over government objectives, at the expense of coordinate branches,
future administrations, the civil service, and the electorate.”80
The descriptive benefit of the workarounds framework is that it reveals a subtle
power dynamic tied up in privatization, which can be easy to miss. Although pri-
vatization often invites concerns that traditionally governmental services have been
entrusted to unaccountable and self-interested private actors81—thus resulting in the
74 This is Mark Tushnet’s formulation. See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1503. Jon Michaels
offers a more focused definition to explain workarounds in the context of Executive decision-
making and privatization. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
717, 728 (2010); see also Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1051, 1129 (2010) (discussing how concurrent powers among the branches allows one
branch to work around another); Mark Tushnet, How Courts Implement Social Policy, 45
TULSA L. REV. 855, 861 (2011) (discussing how judges employ seemingly unrelated prece-
dent to get around other precedent).
75 See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1502.
76 See Michaels, supra note 74, at 719–20, 738–39.
77 For this reason, workarounds can evince what Mark Tushnet calls “a slightly seedy
resonance.” Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1506.
78 See Michaels, supra note 74, at 727.
79 Id. at 738–39.
80 Id. at 727.
81 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J.
437 (2005).
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subordination of public values and contraction of public authority82—Michaels makes
the case that workarounds can have an aggrandizing effect.83 In the data-collection
example, transferring governmental power to private actors enabled the Executive
to side-step rules designed to shrink Executive power. The counterintuitive effect
of this transfer of power is to expand the Executive’s control stealthily, without much
fanfare and at the expense of coordinate branches.84
Applying the workarounds framework to the example of interior enforcement
represents something of a departure from existing accounts, which confront work-
arounds as they are initiated by one branch of government at the expense of another
branch of government (or of the people). By contrast, the phenomenon I address
involves the transfer of power from ICE to local law enforcement agencies. In other
words, the workaround occurs primarily within a single branch of government,
namely the Executive. But the key insight still holds: the transfer of power from ICE
to local entities allows ICE to enlarge its power largely at the expense of a competing
agency, like the DOL, which is also empowered to target bad actor employers. For
example, ICE has agreed to defer to the DOL when an active labor investigation is
underway, but nothing in the MOU requires ICE’s enforcement partners to provide
similar deference.85
One final point: the conversation surrounding workarounds has thus far hesi-
tated to focus on the intent of the actor effectuating the workaround. A part of this
hesitation arises from the absence of any obvious criteria for evaluating whether a
particular workaround is “good” or “bad.”86 Some of the hesitation is because our
understanding of workarounds is still evolving.87 Thus, while workarounds have
emerged as an unmistakable part of the regulatory landscape, we are still at the be-
ginning stages of fully comprehending the extent and nature of this phenomenon.
82 See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135 (2005).
83 See Michaels, supra note 74, at 719.
84 See id. at 728 (explaining that workarounds enlarge executive power over policy,
often stealthily).
85 Under the terms of the agreement, ICE “agrees to be alert to and thwart attempts by
other parties to manipulate its worksite enforcement activities for illicit or improper pur-
poses.” Revised Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 31.
86 Tushnet rejects a “bad motivations” critique of workarounds suggesting that a more
“promising path” is to distinguish between workarounds implicating the Constitution’s “deep
commitments” (what he calls the “thick Constitution”) and those that merely implement those
“deep commitments” (what he calls the “thin Constitution”). Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1506–07.
Framed this way, Tushnet argues that “[i]t is not the purpose or motive that leads to concern
about workarounds but rather their target.” Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1506–07. Jon Michaels
is even clearer on the point of intent: “[t]hough workarounds are often purposive, intent is not
a necessary condition. Workarounds may occur accidentally, incidentally, or even because
the legislature forces the agency’s hand.” Michaels, supra note 74, at 728.
87 Michaels, supra note 74, at 728–29.
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Nevertheless, workarounds are useful for identifying the effects of redesigns, and it
is in this capacity that I borrow the workarounds framework to help explain the
consequences of sharing immigration enforcement authority with local law enforce-
ment agencies.
B. Workarounds in Interior Enforcement
Considered in isolation, the Obama Administration’s workplace enforcement
policy would point to the conclusion that employers have been deprived of a key
tool for suppressing workplace rights. But the broader lens offered by the work-
arounds framework puts that policy in proper context. The parallel rise of S-Comm
enables employers to simply redirect their reporting practices towards police through
an S-Comm workaround. A couple of examples illustrate this dynamic.
In Manchester, Tennessee, several unauthorized workers repeatedly asked their
employer, a cheese manufacturer, about wages that they were owed.88 The employer
refused their grievances, fired the workers, and contacted the local sheriff’s depart-
ment, who arrested the workers for trespass.89 The district attorney dropped all crim-
inal charges against the workers, but a captain in the sheriff’s department reported
these workers to ICE.90 Similarly, several migrant workers in New Orleans were
recruited to perform demolition work in Beaumont, Texas.91 The employer failed to
pay these day laborers the promised wage and treated them adversely and differently
from their white co-workers.92 After complaining about these conditions, the em-
ployer evicted the workers and reported them to the neighboring Port Arthur police,
who arrived with an ICE agent.93 Here again, the local prosecutor dropped all charges
against the workers, but ICE nevertheless issued detainers.94
Both of these examples offer a slight twist on what is a familiar story to immi-
gration scholars: employers reporting the presence of unauthorized workers as a way
of avoiding the costs associated with workplace disputes. But the twist is that neither
of these examples involves an employer directly contacting federal immigration offi-
cials. Rather, the employer nudged their workers into the removal pipeline vis-à-vis
the police. A recent example from Garden Grove, California further illustrates just
how easily “exploitative employers” can recast their workers as “criminal aliens.”
Jose Ucelo-Gonzalez joined other day laborers at a Home Depot parking lot early
88 See Lee, supra note 32, at 1132 (citing Montano-Perez v. Durrett Cheese Sales, Inc.,
666 F. Supp. 2d 894 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)).
89 Id. at 1132–33.
90 Id. at 1133.
91 REBECCA SMITH ET AL., ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT HAS INTERFERED
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one morning.95 Michael Tebb offered him work, which Ucelo-Gonzalez accepted.96
They drove to a convalescent home where Ucelo-Gonzalez agreed to sweep, collect
garbage, and lay asphalt.97 At the end of the work day, Tebb allegedly refused to pay
Ucelo-Gonzalez, cursing and yelling at him and threatening to have him arrested for
stealing.98 Tebb drove away and soon thereafter, eight police cars converged on the
street to arrest Ucelo-Gonzalez.99
He was taken to the Garden Grove police station,100 and eventually Ucelo-Gonzalez
was transferred to Santa Ana county jail where he was questioned by an immigration
officer.101 Ucelo-Gonzalez recounted his story, to which the officer allegedly re-
sponded by encouraging him to sue Tebb.102 He remained in custody, and a few days
later, Ucelo-Gonzalez was transferred to immigration custody, where removal pro-
ceedings were initiated.103
The Ucelo-Gonzalez example demonstrates how differentials in information rules
allow employers to bypass the constraints imposed by the worker-friendly elements
of workplace enforcement policy. Contacting the police allows employers to tap into
an enforcement strategy where information-sharing is not only unconstrained, but
strongly encouraged. Sharing enforcement authority with local police through S-Comm
has the effect of expanding ICE’s power at the expense of agencies like DOL, which
exercise overlapping authority over the workplace. In order for DOL to effectively
police the workplace, ICE must block any immigration-related information flowing
from the workplace to its immigration officials. Doing so signals to workers that
immigration consequences will not flow from workers pursuing legitimate labor-
related claims. Regulatory tools, like the 2011 interagency MOV allow the DOL to
coordinate its enforcement actions with ICE. But now that ICE has transferred a
significant amount of immigration power to localities, the DOL faces an immensely
more difficult task. Because even low-level contact with police can lead to removal,
95 See Complaint para. 6, Ucelo-Gonzalez v. Tebb (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 30-2012-
00588416-CU-ML-CJC).
96 See id. paras. 7, 9.
97 See id. para. 13.
98 See id. para. 10.
99 See id. paras. 20–22.
100 See id. paras. 19–20.
101 See id. para. 24.
102 Ucelo-Gonzalez Declaration para. 25, Ucelo-Gonzalez v. Tebb (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012)
(No. 30-2012-00588416-CU-ML-CJC) (“At the end of the interview, the immigration officer
asked me what I was going to do about what my boss had done. The officer told me that I
should sue my boss for what he had done to me.”).
103 Complaint paras. 27, 30, Ucelo-Gonzalez v. Tebb (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 30-2012-
00588416-CU-ML-CJC). Both in detention and at the work-site, Ucelo-Gonzalez allegedly
met other migrant workers who knew Tebb and who were familiar with his practice of hiring
and refusing to pay day laborers under threat of reporting them to the police. Ucelo-Gonzalez
Declaration paras. 8, 28, Ucelo-Gonzalez v. Tebb (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 30-2012-00588416-
CU-ML-CJC).
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the DOL must account for the broad cross-section of policies and practices governing
the various local law enforcement agencies initiating such contact.
To be fair, different localities value immigrants differently. More specifically,
different police departments and prosecutorial offices often administer competing
visions of criminal justice for noncitizens.104 Where law enforcement officials value
the role that immigrants can play as informants or witnesses, or where the costs of
assisting the federal government are simply too high,105 police might be reluctant to
charge into a workplace without some measure of pause. Indeed, some localities
might be inclined to reward police who refuse to assist employers in the exploitation
of unauthorized migrants.106 But as the Ucelo-Gonzalez case demonstrates, the in-
formation flow is automatic under S-Comm, which can create a problem of mixed
signals. The assigned immigration officer suggested that Ucelo-Gonzalez had a
legitimate claim against his boss while simultaneously holding him in detention
while a detainer issued. This example illustrates how routine and low-level local
policing decisions can nevertheless open a conduit for information. Indeed, the
Executive’s shift away from 287(g) agreements towards S-Comm only bolsters this
conclusion. Moving a nationwide fingerprint collection system to the top of ICE’s
interior enforcement toolkit demonstrates how immigration officials can get the
benefit of local enforcement without having to worry about local buy in.
This distinction is important because many localities would presumably resist
the idea of serving as an employer workaround, but S-Comm complicates the pro-
cess by which police might implement such an “immigrant-friendly” policy. More-
over, the alleged facts surrounding the Ucelo-Gonzalez case suggest that Tebb felt
quite comfortable contacting the police. But they do not establish that he contacted
them because he perceived contacting ICE as too risky—nor should he have had to
in order for the workarounds characterization to apply.107 Moving forward, a thicker,
more developed empirical account of how police are responding to S-Comm could
help us assess whether the workarounds phenomenon will persist only in those “gung
ho” jurisdictions where police fully embrace immigration enforcement duties or
whether it will seep into any jurisdiction regardless of its relationship to immigrants.
104 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
105 See Santa Clara County to Stop Honoring Immigration Detainers for Low-Level
Offenders, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow
/2011/10/santa-clara-county-to-stop-honoring-immigration-detainers-for-low-level
-offenders-.html.
106 For example, in Garden Grove, three day laborers—all unauthorized migrants—
approached police for help in recovering wages from their employer. See Jennifer Mena, 2
Policeman Hailed for Effort to Get Wages That Day Laborers Are Owed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2001, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/20/local/me-47727. The officers decided to assist
the laborers in their cause, and as a result, received recognition from several public officials. Id.
107 For an example of this kind of discretionary decisionmaking during the pre–S-Comm
era, see Mena, supra note 106; see also Motomura, supra note 16.
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The story of S-Comm undermining workplace protections for unauthorized work-
ers is still in its formative stages—for the moment, we are forced to rely on a patchwork
of sources including newspaper accounts, court opinions, and reports by advocacy
organizations. Therefore, any conclusions we draw about the scope of the workarounds
phenomenon is necessarily speculative—but that is part of my point. Because immi-
gration scholarship has traditionally treated the workplace and the criminal justice
system as separate institutions of regulation, there is much we do not know.108
C. Historical Analogues
As a screening policy, S-Comm is not only comprehensive, it is compulsory. It
shifts the default rule. Rather than giving localities the choice to opt into the immi-
gration enforcement system (as the 287(g) program does), S-Comm simply siphons
off information from every arrest involving the extraction of fingerprint data. Such
programs further complicate the process by which workplace disputes are resolved.
Because the program transforms every arrest into an immigration-related screening
opportunity, the police can be called upon (even unwittingly) to resolve such disputes.
This represents a step backwards towards an era when the police heavily participated
in the regulation of work and workplace disputes. Up until the middle of the twentieth
century, labor disputes were regulated by the common law,109 and the police often
played the role of enforcer.110 With the passage of New Deal legislation111 and the
rise of the administrative state, workplace disputes shifted venues and became subject
108 In a forthcoming piece, Adam Cox and Thomas Miles offer a useful quantitative analy-
sis of how ICE rolled out S-Comm nationwide. See Cox & Miles, supra note 60. Their study
tests a variety of hypotheses, but they all relate to federal officials. See id. This is, however, an
ongoing project, and future projects may provide greater insight on how S-Comm is changing
the way police exercise their power. We have a better understanding of how Section 287(g)
is changing the practices of the police, see, e.g., Amada Armenta, From Sheriff’s Deputies
to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail, 34 L. & POL’Y 191
(2012), but it is hard to extrapolate too many lessons given the difference between Section
287(g)’s “opt-in” structure providing officers with a clear and formal set of parameters in
which they can exercise their delegated immigration authority and S-Comm’s database-
driven structure, in which officers need not realize the immigration consequences of their
arresting decisions in order to carry out their screening duties. 
109 See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983). Rights and responsibilities that developed over
centuries within the realms of property, contract, and tort provided management and labor
with guidance on who was right and who was wrong. See id.
110 See id. at 1387 (noting that employers using force to prevent unionization would
amount to tortious and criminal conduct at common law).
111 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006) (reg-
ulating relations between employers and employees who participate in labor unions and engage
in collective bargaining); see also Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219
(2006) (regulating employees’ work hours and wages).
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to civil administrative rules, which were developed and overseen by a mix of bureau-
crats, administrative law judges, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).112
Thus, since the 1940s, labor disputes have often stumbled towards resolution with-
out police interference.113 But the prospect of S-Comm–initiated workarounds invites
police back into the workplace. Put differently, after a long period of desuetude, crim-
inal law and labor law once again confront the possibility of colliding with one another.
Only this time, labor law must work against the constraints imposed by the police
acting, not as street-level embodiments of criminal law’s local authority, but rather
as agents of immigration law’s federal authority imposed remotely by DHS.
During this period, the line separating criminal law and labor law was not al-
ways easy to discern. For example, the right to strike established under the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (commonly known as the Wagner Act)114 gave workers
the opportunity to contest and mitigate the advantage that employers otherwise en-
joy within the common law regime of contract.115 This was one of the key labor
rights established under the Wagner Act.116 At the same time, striking is an emo-
tional endeavor. It can be confrontational, and it is a gamble. It asks workers to set
aside short-term individual gain in the interests of long-term collective gain. When
strikes begin arising in the workplace, they inevitably begin impinging upon the em-
ployer’s right to expel trespassers. Thus, a key conflict defining the early years of
implementing the Wagner Act stemmed from the question of whether a worker’s
labor rights could displace an employer’s property rights.117 This question posed
some difficulty to the Court because neither management nor labor could authori-
tatively claim the moral high ground.118
112 Of course, criminal law still plays a significant role in regulating access to work. See
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003).
113 See Epstein, supra note 109, at 1403–04 (explaining that the New Deal legislation
created an administrative state to deal with labor disputes to which courts were forced to
give deference).
114 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158, 163 (2006). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act).
115 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return
of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783 (1996) (discussing the effects of common law
contract rules on employment contracts and noting imbalances in bargaining between em-
ployers and employees).
116 Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 63, 157–158 (2006).
117 See, e.g., Holly J. McCammon, Legal Limits on Labor Militancy: U.S. Labor Law and
the Right to Strike Since the New Deal, 37 SOC. PROBS. 206, 211–12 (1990) (noting that legal
interpretations of the Wagner Act attempted to balance the rights of employees to strike with
the private property rights of employers).
118 The employers argued that sit-down strikes violated their property rights, while the
unions defended them as vital to the right to strike. See Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-
Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial Relations, 1935–1958, 24 L. & HIST.
REV. 45, 71–73, 85 (2006). Thus, they argued, the right to strike should prevail in the face
of an employer’s unclean hands. Id.
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In NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,119 the Court resolved this conflict in
favor of employers.120 Fansteel manufactured and sold rare metals, and had em-
ployed a variety of tactics to undermine a unionization effort.121 As a response, the
union organized sit-down strikes where workers occupied several key buildings in
the manufacturing plant.122 In concluding that an employer’s property rights could
displace workers’ labor rights, the Court curtailed the reach of the Wagner Act,123
thus marking the beginning of a line of cases that followed suit.124 More importantly,
Fansteel also created room for state and local criminal law to regulate workplace
disputes.125 A key part of the sit-down strike era of labor law was that it was the local
police who arrested and detained labor dissenters, sometimes in violent and oppres-
sive ways.126 Even as the presence of private security forces in manufacturing plants
began to wane (or at least evolve),127 the public police regularly intervened in large-
scale workplace disputes.128
Fansteel and its progeny, and the story of sit-down strikes more generally, have
a particular resonance with the story of immigration enforcement: it was the key line
of cases that the Court relied on in concluding that unauthorized migrants had no
right to back pay in its 2002 decision, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.129
Although Hoffman has been heavily criticized by immigration law scholars for the
ways it perpetuates the exploitation of unauthorized workers,130 the decision also
119 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
120 Id. at 253.
121 For example, the employer had utilized a “labor spy” to infiltrate the workforce and
refused to bargain with the worker’s designated collective bargaining representative. See id.
at 247–48.
122 Id. at 248.
123 As Jim Pope observes,
The Fansteel Court affirmed that both [employer’s tactics and workers’
tactics] were illegal, but also concluded that the employer could violate
the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights, while
the workers could not violate the employer’s property rights without
sacrificing their statutory rights—a return to the hierarchy of values
that predated the Wagner Act.
Pope, supra note 118, at 106.
124 Just a few years later, the Court extended the Fansteel principle to mutinies that arose on
a ship. See S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). For a critique of this case, see Ahmed
A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of New Deal Labor
Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275 (2004).
125 See Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and the Limits of Liberal
Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
126 See Pope, supra note 118, at 88–89, 98; White, supra note 125, at 27–28.
127 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1214–20 (1999).
128 See id. at 1220.
129 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
130 See, e.g., Anne Marie O’Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers’ Compensation
After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299,
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marks a door to a past era when the police policed workplace disputes.131 Employers
using criminal law to work around workplace enforcement policy not only present
a new regulatory challenge to immigration officials, but they also create opportuni-
ties for the police to resume their role as interlocutors in workplace disputes.
III. UNDERSTANDING WORKAROUNDS IN INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT
As loudly as defenders of immigrant rights have condemned the Obama Admin-
istration’s rapid insinuations into the criminal justice system,132 they have applauded
the Administration’s delicate hand within the workplace.133 But the rise of S-Comm–
initiated workarounds suggests that the reasons for condemnation may soon overtake
the reasons for applause. Without seeing the entire interior enforcement field, we
might be too quick to write off stories like those arising in Manchester, Beaumont,
and Garden Grove as simply the latest examples of employers acting badly with regard
to immigrants. But the expansion of local immigration enforcement programs into
the workplace enforcement landscape forces us to look beyond the familiar problem—
that employers are reporting their workers to escape labor violations, and begin consid-
ering the equally important set of questions involving to whom they are reporting them.
In this final Part, I briefly address how the Executive might address the workplace
enforcement phenomenon. As an initial matter, workarounds in the interior pose a
problem only to the extent that they frustrate the particular substantive vision set out
by the Executive. President Obama has decided to prioritize “criminal aliens” and
“exploitative employers” within its interior enforcement agenda. It is a part of a
deliberate, and relatively transparent policy of using its resources in a cost effective
manner,134 accommodating immigration’s member-selection goals,135 and coordinat-
ing the enforcement agendas of various agencies. Here, ICE has intensified its pursuit
300 (2006) (“Employers have taken the Hoffman decision as a green light to contend that
undocumented workers are without a range of state and federal workplace rights . . . .”).
131 See White, supra note 125, at 68 (noting that, after Hoffman, undocumented employees
could not receive the protections of labor laws).
132 See Preston, supra note 69.
133 Preston, supra note 29.
134 In the same speech where the President recognized the inevitable removal of even im-
migrant workers, the President also explained that rather than enforcing immigration laws
“haphazardly,” the DHS was “focusing [its] limited resources and people on violent offenders
and people convicted of crimes—not just families, not just folks who are just looking to scrape
together an income. And as a result, we’ve increased the removal of criminals by 70 percent.”
President on Comprehensive Immigration, supra 39. And of course, the shift in workplace en-
forcement policy may very well represent a response to the shifting preferences of the public.
See Preston, supra note 39.
135 Because the Executive can remove only a small percentage of all unauthorized mi-
grants, enforcement priorities effectively dictate the rules of de facto membership. See Morton
Memorandum, supra note 3 (noting that ICE has the resources to remove no more than 400,000
individuals, or less than 4% of the total unauthorized migrant population).
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of “criminal aliens” to the point of enabling “exploitative employers” to avoid detec-
tion by reporting workers to police, which effectively recasts workers—the victims
of exploitation—as “criminal aliens.” The Executive has great discretion over how
it chooses to prioritize and reconcile its various enforcement goals, and certainly the
Executive can strike the balance that it sees fit between these goals. But the chal-
lenge involves giving the President and high-level policymakers the opportunity to
respond to the manner in which ICE is striking the balance.136
In pursuing criminal aliens, ICE has employed a variety of local enforcement
programs, but it is clear that S-Comm is its program of choice. According to DHS,
S-Comm offers superior screening capabilities and, for this reason, it has moved
programs like the Section 287(g) program to the margins.137 But this alleged gain in
screening capability comes at a cost. This reorganization removes one major way that
the Executive, as a principal, has traditionally exercised oversight over its agents: by
setting clear conditions of delegated authority. To appreciate this dynamic, consider
how the Executive controls agents through the 287(g) program.138 Because that pro-
gram transfers authority to local law enforcement, the delegation of power can in-
clude any number of conditions and qualifications, which could reduce the likelihood
that police would willingly facilitate labor suppression. The MOA—the 287(g)’s
primary oversight instrument—could impose conditions on police similar to those
imposed on low-level ICE officials. They could prohibit police from responding to
tips or leads where the surrounding circumstances suggested the presence of an on-
going workplace dispute. Or the police could be prohibited from carrying out their
immigration-related duties in workplaces where labor-related investigations were
already underway. The Executive could punish wayward jurisdictions for failing to
136 Michaels, supra note 74, at 769.
137 In its 2013 budget brief, the DHS explained:
In light of the nationwide activation of the Secure Communities pro-
gram, the Budget reduces the 287(g) program by $17 million. The Secure
Communities screening process is more consistent, efficient and cost
effective in identifying and removing criminal and other priority aliens.
To implement this reduction in 2013, ICE will begin by discontinuing
the least productive 287(g) task force agreements in those jurisdictions
where Secure Communities is already in place and will also suspend
consideration of any requests for new 287(g) task forces.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2013: BUDGET IN BRIEF 16, available at http://www.dhs
.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf.
138 To tease out the insights generated by workplace enforcement workarounds, I focus on
only the 287(g) program and S-Comm. Again, it is worth noting that in reality, a spectrum
of possibilities separates the two models. See generally Chacón, supra note 44 (comparing
different methods of state and local police participation in immigration enforcement that give
rise to rights violations). But for purposes of drawing out the different challenges involved
with coordinating enforcement agendas, it is most useful to focus on these two programs,
given the different ways in which each allocates power to the police.
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remain within the bounds of these conditions. One can imagine a local law enforce-
ment agency serially ignoring these workplace enforcement-oriented conditions only
to have its 287(g) authority revoked just as the Executive did with Arizona in the wake
of the Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of SB 1070. The point is that the MOA-
driven 287(g) program allows the Executive to signal its preferences and desires,
and it empowers it to punish wayward localities accordingly. By contrast, S-Comm
provides the Executive with no comparable signaling or oversight opportunities. As
an enforcement program, it rests on different design principles.139 The program is
designed to use police as a conduit of information. That is, it facilitates the enforce-
ment of immigration laws while minimizing the formal discretion that police enjoy
over immigration decisions.140
Tinkering with the delegation instrument is not the only way the Executive can
harmonize competing enforcement goals. Rather than coordinating the actions of its
agents—employers and local police—the Executive can screen out “false positives”
at the back-end. Framed this way, Ucelo-Gonzalez is a “screening error,” which can
be corrected by immigration officials once he is placed in removal proceedings. The
Obama Administration’s recent embrace of large-scale exercises of prosecutorial
discretion reflect this sentiment. The Administration’s string of “Morton memos”141
lists factors supporting the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion—high-
achieving college students, members of same-sex relationships, and victims of civil
rights abuses can apply for such discretionary relief—but in most cases, the applica-
tions can be filed only after removal proceedings have been initiated.142 The specific
139 The informational challenges are different and hard to reconcile. ICE agreed with a
series of recommendations offered by a Task Force to improve upon the administration of the
S-Comm program. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
ICE RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ICE RESPONSE], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib
/secure-communities/pdf/hsac-sc-taskforce-report.pdf. Importantly, ICE registered its dis-
agreement over the recommendation that it tailor the information it provides to local police. Id.
at 16. Under S-Comm, once local police upload an arrestee’s fingerprints, the local police
may request information about the individual. Id. at 11. Some of this information (like ICE’s
initial status determination) advances immigration enforcement goals, while other information
(like biographical information) facilitates traditional law enforcement goals. But the informa-
tion is delivered in a bundled package, which prevents local law enforcement agencies from
credibly representing to surrounding communities that their partnership with immigration
officials does not increase the likelihood of federal involvement. See id. Thus, disaggregating
information delivery would give local police the benefit of participating in S-Comm without
absorbing the cost. But ICE rejected this request. See id. at 16.
140 Cox & Posner, supra note 19, at 51. But cf. Motomura, supra note 16.
141 The colloquial term is in reference to ICE director, John Morton. See Morton Memo-
randum, supra note 3.
142 The exception is high-achieving college graduates, who can affirmatively apply for
such relief under the “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” program. See Consideration
of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
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facts of the Ucelo-Gonzalez case are consistent with this evolving approach to im-
migration regulatory issues. Indeed, this helps reconcile the seemingly contradictory
actions of the designated immigration officer in the Santa Ana jail who, on the one
hand, advised Ucelo-Gonzalez to “sue [his] boss for what he had done to [him],”143
while on the other hand, holding Ucelo-Gonzalez in custody until an immigration
detainer was issued. Arresting Ucelo-Gonzalez may have set in motion the initiation
of removal proceedings, but he has the opportunity to avoid removal but pursuing
workplace claims against Tebb, which would make him eligible for a favorable ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion.
This centralized approach to reconciling competing enforcement goals is alluring,
but it places a tremendous amount of discretion in the hands of the immigration of-
ficials overseeing a particular case. In prior work, I have argued that the ability of the
President and senior advisors to implement labor-friendly workplace enforcement
policy often gets undermined by low-level agency officials within ICE who tend to
resist such policies.144 An agency’s mission, the presence of multiple and often com-
peting regulatory goals, and work culture all constrain the ability of the White House
to implement on-the-ground shifts in enforcement policy. As Tino Cuéllar explains,
“[w]ithin bureaucracies, ICE agents and other law enforcement personnel may resist
wholesale ramp-downs in enforcement.”145 Thus, he concludes that “while a mix of
judicially acknowledged discretion and resource limitations leave presidential ad-
ministrations with a measure of control over enforcement, their choices are limited
by larger forces they are only partially able to affect.”146
A string of anecdotal evidence confirms this account. Despite the Obama Ad-
ministration’s attempt to exercise a modicum of mercy against certain immigrants
who are otherwise removable—the class of immigrants to which Ucelo-Gonzalez
would apparently belong—several ICE officials have publicly resisted this shift in
policy. Since President Obama took office, he has faced some difficulty in getting
low-level officials to step in line with his shift in policy.147 The most recent obstacle
involves the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which gives
certain unauthorized immigrant youths a temporary but renewable reprieve against
removal.148 Several ICE officials filed a lawsuit against DHS alleging that they are
http://www.uscis.gov/ (follow hyperlink for Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals Process under Humanitarian section) (last updated Nov. 30, 2012) (explaining that
current undocumented students, so long as they meet other criteria, may affirmatively apply
for consideration for deferred action under ICE’s new guidelines).
143 Ucelo-Gonzalez Declaration para. 25, Ucelo-Gonzalez v. Tebb (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012)
(No. 30-2012-00588416-CU-ML-CJC).
144 Lee, supra note 32, at 1106–10.
145 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1, 57 (2012).
146 Id.
147 For some examples, see Lee, supra note 32, at 1108–09.
148 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship &
574 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:549
being reprimanded for resisting DACA implementation efforts.149 One of the plain-
tiffs in the lawsuit is the president of the union representing the ICE officers.150 He
claims that DACA asks officers “to break the law” and “puts ICE agents and officers
in a horrible position.”151 The merits of the officers’ position are arguable,152 but the
salient point is that the heterogeneity of interests pervading the Executive poses an
obstacle to the Obama Administration’s approach of reconciling competing interior
enforcement goals through prosecutorial review of cases at the back-end.
CONCLUSION
Both law and scholarship suggest that the President enjoys significant leeway
in using his enforcement powers to cobble together a set of workable membership
rules.153 Most recently, this vision of the President found an audience with the Su-
preme Court as it addressed whether Arizona’s immigration enforcement statute,
known as SB 1070, was preempted by federal law.154 Notably, several of the Justices
expressed unease over the degree to which the Executive controlled immigration
policy.155 The federal government’s core argument was that SB 1070 was preempted
because to hold otherwise would allow Arizona (or any other state with a similar law)
Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial
-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
149 See Lornet Turnbull, ICE Agents Sue Over Program to Defer Deporting, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, at B1.
150 See Alan Gomez, ICE Agents Sue Own Agency Over Deferred Deportations, USA
TODAY, Aug. 24, 2012, at 8A.
151 Id.
152 See Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, UCLA
Sch. of Law, et al., to the President (May 28, 2012), available at http://www.nilc.org/document
.html?id=754. But cf. John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, The Obama Administration, the
DREAM Act and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
153 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 510–18 (2009) (noting that immigration law’s identification of a large
class of deportable persons, coupled with the President’s wide prosecutorial discretion, gives
the President de facto power to decide which immigrants are deported and which are not);
see also, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) (making all unlawful
entrants automatically deportable and identifying a class of lawful entrants as deportable).
154 The Court struck down most of the law leaving intact one provision concerning the au-
thority of police officers to verify the immigration status of investigative targets. See Arizona
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–07 (2012).
155 See id. at 2524, 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he
Executive’s current enforcement policy is an astounding assertion of federal executive power
that the Court rightly rejects.”); id. at 2520–21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that the Executive’s ability to exercise discretion over immigration policies
limits Arizona’s ability to protect its borders by making it fundamentally dependent on the
choices of the Executive).
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to dictate how the Executive should allocate its scarce enforcement resources.156
Five Justices found such an argument consistent with the theory that the political
branches more generally enjoy deference within immigration law.157 Concurring in
part and dissenting in part, Justice Alito expressed skepticism over this position.158
He would disaggregate the President from Congress in analyzing the preemption
question.159 To do otherwise would give preemptive force to current enforcement
priorities, which could lead to the very same state laws being “unpre-empted at some
time in the future if the agency’s priorities changed.”160 The most strident position
was offered by Justice Scalia, who went so far as to say that the Executive’s position
“boggles the mind” when considered in light of the post-argument Executive deci-
sion to grant deferred status to over a million high-achieving undocumented youth.161
Members of Congress162 and the academy163 have lodged similar criticisms.
But the Executive is not as monolithic as this picture suggests. Immigration-
related authority is disaggregated across the administrative state and while disag-
gregation has its benefits, a consequence of this regulatory approach is that points
of intersection are inevitable even if they are not always obvious. Immigration law
has grown well into the interior. Job announcements and traffic stops implicate the
immigration code in a way that only passing through ports of entry once did. As
some have observed, the border has moved.164
To its credit, the Obama Administration has refined workplace enforcement
policy and reallocated resources for the purposes of preventing bad actor employers
156 See Brief for Respondent at 21, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No.
11-182). Margaret Hu refers to these kinds of laws as attempts at “reverse-commandeering”
of federal sources and thus unconstitutional. See Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
157 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498–500.
158 See id. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159 See id. at 2528 (analyzing the preemption question as a function solely of congres-
sional intent).
160 See id.; see also David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1125 (2012).
161 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2522 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For
a critique of Scalia’s dissenting opinion, see Richard A. Posner, Supreme Court Year in
Review, Entry 11: Justice Scalia Is Upset About Illegal Immigration. But Where Is His




162 Congressman Lamar Smith, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, characterized
this as an “amnesty” and “an overreach of executive branch authority.” See Letter from Lamar
Smith, Congressman, to John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
(July 3, 2012), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/DreamActLetterICE.pdf.
163 See Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 152.
164 See Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115 (2009).
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from acting badly with regard to migrant labor.165 But its increased reliance on po-
lice to screen criminal noncitizens threatens to undermine these efforts. Although
the workplace and the criminal justice system appear to comprise separate spheres
within the interior, database-driven enforcement on the criminal side is bringing
these two spheres together by creating opportunities for employers to evade work-
place enforcement rules to which they would ordinarily be subject. This insight pro-
vides immigrant rights advocates with another reason to be suspicious of S-Comm,
presents the Obama Administration with a difficult policy choice to make, and invites
other scholars to search for and evaluate other workarounds within the sprawling
immigration state.
165 See Julia Preston, White House Plan on Immigration Includes Legal Status, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A10.
